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  • Section Four: Other Provisions

    • Article (25) Exemption from Liability

      1) The Central Bank, members of the Board of Directors, members of committees formed by the Board of Directors, whether from within its membership or from outside, staff of the Central Bank and its duly authorized representatives, shall all be exempt from civil liability towards third parties, in respect of the following:

      unless bad faith, with intent to harm third parties, was established.

      • a. Exercise, or failure to exercise, the functions, powers, authorities and businesses of the Central Bank, or their own functions, competencies and powers, authorities, and all related practices;
      • b. Instructions, guidelines, declarations, data, statements and opinions given by them in relation to the practice of the Central Bank’s functions, powers, authorities and businesses, or their own functions, competencies, authorities and businesses –

      2) The Central Bank shall bear all charges, costs, expenses, and attorney fees relating to defense of the Persons referred to in item (1) of this article, in lawsuits pertaining to discharge of their functions at the Central Bank

    • Article (26) Confidential Information

      1) Any member of the Board of Directors, any member of the committees formed by the Board of Directors, any employees or representatives of the Central Bank; any experts, technical personnel, or academics the Central Bank deals with, shall not disclose any information that is confidential, unless such disclosure is consistent with the provisions of item (3) of this article. This prohibition shall remain effective even after the expiry of membership or termination of the service or the function.

      2) Confidential information shall include all information received by any of the Persons referred to in item (1) of this article, by virtue of their positions, or in the course of discharging their functions, as long as such information were not made available to the public through official or legal means.

      3) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article (28) of this decretal law, confidential information may be disclosed where such disclosure is permitted, legally enforced, or addressed to authorities and agencies within the State or in other jurisdictions

    • Article (27) Declaration of Conflict of Interest

      1) A member of the Board of Directors shall, upon his appointment, declare his interests, which may conflict with his membership at the Board of Directors, and whenever a conflict of interest arises. Should any member of the Board of Directors have a personal interest in any contract or dealing to which the Central Bank is party, such member must declare those interest prior to the discussion of the subject; withdraw from the meeting when such dealing or contract is discussed, and should not participate in voting pertaining thereto, in accordance with the code of conduct and governance rules issued by the Board of Directors.

      2) Every employee or representative of the Central Bank shall disclose to his manager, or his immediate superior, any interest which may be in conflict with the discharge of his functions, and he may not participate in exchange of opinions, and decisions or measures, taken in this regard.

      3) The Board of Directors shall establish codes of conduct for employees and representatives of the Central Bank, as well as disclosure procedures, compliance, and governance

    • Article (28) Cooperation with Local & International Authorities

      1) The Central Bank may, within the scope of its jurisdiction and in accordance with the Law, cooperate with the concerned regulatory authorities in other countries, and with international institutions, in providing assistance and exchanging information, subject to the following:

      • a. The request is made on basis of reciprocity.
      • b. The request does not contravene any of the State’s established laws and regulations.
      • c. The request is serious and important.
      • d. The request is not in conflict with the public interest and public order requirements.

      2) The Central Bank shall, in coordination and collaboration with the concerned regulatory authorities, within applicable laws, exercise its powers on Licensed Financial Institutions operating outside the State or in Financial Free Zones.

    • Article (29) Engagement of Experts, Technical Personnel & Academics

      The Central Bank may seek assistance of experts, technical personnel and academics, determine their remunerations and entitlements. The Board of Directors may also invite to its meetings whomever it may wish to hear their opinion on a specific issue, and such invitee to the meeting shall have no counted vote in deliberations

    • Article (30) Publication of Draft Rules & Regulations

      1) The Central Bank may publish the draft regulations and rules it intends to issue in relation to organization of businesses of Licensed Financial Institutions and Licensed Financial Activities, for their feedback, via a public notice to the concerned parties.

      2) The Central Bank may invite concerned parties to provide their feedback on the draft rules and regulations referred to in item (1) of this article, within the period prescribed by the Central Bank.

      3) The Central Bank may decide not to publish the draft regulations referred to in item (1) of this article, if it deems such publication contrary to public interest, or to the achievement of the Central Bank’s objectives and discharge of its functions

    • Article (31) Objectives of Monetary Policy

      1) Monetary policy shall be aimed at maintaining soundness and stability of the monetary system in the State, in order to ensure stability and required confidence in the national economy.

      2) The Central Bank shall determine monetary tools and operational means for achievement of monetary policy objectives, including policies relating to management of the exchange rate of the national Currency and money markets in the State.

      3) The Central Bank shall, on basis of a proposal by the Board of Directors and approval of the Cabinet, determine the national Currency’s exchange rate regime.

      4) The Central Bank may, for operational purposes, take necessary measures to manage and control the official exchange rate of the national Currency, as per the guidelines set by the Board of Director

    • Article (32) Reserve Requirements

      1) The Central Bank may, in line with monetary policy objectives and the current and forecasted status of liquidity, determine and keep with it, minimum Reserve Requirements for each type of deposits, or on total of deposits held with deposit-taking Licensed Financial Institutions. The Board of Directors shall determine the manner in which ratio of the Reserve Requirements is calculated, as it deems appropriate.

      2) The Central Bank shall specify all operational arrangements related to the maintenance of the Reserve Requirements referred to in item (1) of this article

    • Article (33) Credit Conditions Surveillance

      The Central Bank may set regulations which determine limits of credit facilities extended by Licensed Financial Institutions to their customers, compared to the total of their stable resources or to the total of deposits of their customers. Such limits may be prescribed for a specific Licensed Financial Institution or for all Licensed Financial Institutions

    • Article (34) Coordination between Monetary & Fiscal Policies

      The Central Bank and the Ministry shall establish a mechanism for coordinating monetary policy and fiscal policy for the purpose of achieving balanced growth in the national economy. Such coordination shall take place before the beginning of each financial year, and whenever necessary, and shall be in respect of volume of government expenditure, the Government’s debt, and debts of governments of emirates members of the Union, along with debts of Government Related Entities, companies and institutions which they own, hold shares in, or manage, and their plans regarding domestic and foreign public debt.

    • Article (35) Designating Systemically Important Licensed Financial Institutions

      The Central Bank shall solely have the authority to designate any Licensed Financial Institution as systemically important. For such purpose, the Central Bank may require the designated Licensed Financial Institution to take required measures and procedures

    • Article (36) Domestic Market Statistic

      1) The Public Sector and other agencies as the Board of Directors deems necessary, shall provide the Central Bank with all the information and statistics it requires for the purpose of performing its functions under the provisions of this decretal law. Such information and statistics shall include all monetary and economic statistics, as well as balance of payments statistics and consumer prices. The Central Bank may publish the statistics it deems appropriate, in whole or in part.

      2) The Central Bank shall obtain the approval of other Regulatory Authorities in the State regarding provision and/or publication of non-public information and statistics in relation to institutions under the supervision of those authorities

    • Article (37) Research

      1) The Central Bank may conduct research and analyses in areas of macro-economy, conduct of monetary policy, and banking and financial operations, as deemed of strategic importance to the State economy.

      2) The Central Bank shall publish and issue regular statistical reports, quarterly and annual reviews of the Central Bank, policy briefs and working papers that contain analyses of the relevant data to inform policy decisions, as deemed appropriate.